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Abstract
We show that in a duopoly with homogeneous consumers, if these
are negatively influenceable by each other behavior (e.g. congestion/
snob/ Veblen/ network eﬀects), a pure price equilibrium with positive
profits for both firms exists. Furthermore, even in the case products are
undiﬀerentiated, an equilibrium where firms charge diﬀerent (positive)
prices and have diﬀerent profits exists. Thus, when firms engage in uni-
form price competition, heterogeneity, and in particular non-atomicity
in the distribution of preferences, is neither a necessary condition to
ensure existence, nor to achieve asymmetries. We further show that
in the case products are diﬀerentiated, social diﬀerentiation overcomes
the eﬀect of standard diﬀerentiation in creating price asymmetries.
Keywords: Social influence; Bertrand duopoly; Bertrand competition;
network eﬀects; product diﬀerentiation; homogeneous products; pure price
equilibrium; linear demand.
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Introduction
Price dispersion and periods of price stability are fairly common phenomenons
in many service markets. In fact they are embedded in consumption behav-
ior: we compare prices (thus expect price dispersion), but not on a daily
basis (we expect some price stability). Yet, pure (asymmetric) price equilib-
ria, above marginal costs, persisted as problematic to achieve in the context
of uniform price competition within oligopoly theory.1 The discrepancy be-
tween what is a natural expectancy but a theoretical modelling diﬃculty is
troubling and well reflected in the so called paradoxical and unconvincing
nature of Bertrand’s zero profit equilibrium.
The problem has in general been attributed to the simplistic and homo-
geneous nature of the original Bertrand framework ([6], [32]). Standard and
most convincing solutions are essentially two-folded: introducing some form
of (exogeneous) heterogeneity, either in the firm or consumer side, accompa-
nyed by some further assumption which can ensure demand continuity and
stabilize competition in pure price strategies.2 If both product and consumers
are homogeneous, and heterogeneity is introduced in the cost structure, ‘there
1Tirole [32] refered to the study of price competition as simultaneously a fundamental
part and one of [the] weakest links of oligopoly theory, and Vives [33] even defined the
oligopoly problem as ‘centered around the potential indeterminateness of price equilibria
with a few number of competitors’.
2Alternative approaches would involve leaving the standard Bertrand framework and
considering other strategic variables for firms, for example, by allowing firms to compete
in quantities, as in Cournot, choosing/investing in quality, or others. Note that solutions
based on the temporal dimension can in fact be seen as introducing timing as a strategic
variable.
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are serious existence problems ’ (Maskin [26]). Heterogeneity in costs in-
troduces an asymmetric lower point in the undercutting descent dynamics,
which prevents firms from stabilizing at a common zero profit stopping point,
but requires a further assumption to be stabilized. With diﬀerentiable and
increasing cost functions, equilibrium prices above marginal costs in general
involve mixed strategies, and in the extreme cases of constant costs or ca-
pacity constrains, prices stay at marginal costs, for the former, and for the
latter pure equilibria exist only for small capacities and are symmetric (see
for example [32] or [13]). As such, since Edgeworth showed this price indeter-
minacy problem, the stabilization on pure price strategies has been based on
product diﬀerentiation and heterogeneity of consumer preferences specified
by a non-atomic distribution (Hotelling’s approach). Caplin and Nalebuﬀ
[12] show that for multi-dimensional product diﬀerentiation, if preferences
are linear in the weights assigned to product benefits, and the distribution
of consumer types can be represented by a density function which satisfies
a weak form of concavity, then pure price equilibria exist. Palma et al [27]
show that if firms treat the utility of a particular consumer as a random
variable due to a lack of information regarding the tastes of that consumer,
suﬃcient heterogeneity ensures a pure price equilibrium.
The caveat in these approaches is that they provide suﬃcient, but not
necessary conditions for existence (as emphasized by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ
[12]). In particular, it is not established the necessity of imposing some
form of heterogeneity to achieve a pure price equilibrium with prices above
marginal costs. Rather, the framework is changed from homogeneous to het-
erogeneous, and it is this new problem which is solved. As a result, the
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existence and asymmetry of an equilibrium with positive profits often be-
comes a byproduct of exogenously imposed heterogeneity. Whether this is
always the case is seemingly a question still to be addressed.3 Burdett and
Judd [10] use consumer search behavior to show that, with infinite firms,
ex ante heterogeneity is not a necessary condition to achieve an equilibrium
with price dispersion. However, a search friction is not enough to ensure price
dispersion for small markets (or a countable number of firms), as it drives
all equilibrium prices from marginal cost to the monopoly price, as shown by
Diamond [14]. As such, for small markets the open questions still remain:
do positive asymmetric pure price solutions exist for a priori completely ho-
mogeneous markets? Do positive asymmetric pure price solutions exist for
atomic distributions of consumer preferences?
From a game theory perspective, there is an inherent strategic asymmetry
in the original Bertrand framework. The set of players is composed of firms
and consumers, thus a strategy profile consists of prices set by firms and
3Hotelling himself [19] may arguably be asking this same question with his location
game: may these type of solutions be achieved endogenously? Although d’Aspremont et
al [4] later show that in fact they could not (with the original formulation), there is in
Hotelling’s model an entanglement between heterogeneity of product and consumers (a
single space is used to represent both diversity of products and consumers). Once the dis-
entanglement is made and solutions found for homogeneous products, for example through
vertical diﬀerentiation [22] or diﬀerent price sensitivities [2], one is ready to adress the issue
of necessity of heterogeneity of consumers, independent of product heterogeneity. How-
ever, solutions which rely on non-atomic distributions of consumer preferences, to ensure
continuity in aggregate demand, exclude the case of homogeneous consumers, by exclud-
ing the possibility of atomic distributions. Furthermore, these solutions for homogeneous
products are often symmetric and/ or stay at marginal costs.
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purchasing choices by consumers, but while firms best response depends on
the whole strategy profile (its price, the prices set by other firms and demand
based on consumption behavior), consumers best response is assumed to de-
pend only on prices and not on the other consumers’ choices, hence ignoring
part of the game’s strategic profile. Notwithstanding that in some markets
this may still be an appropriate modeling assumption, in most markets to-
day the role that consumers play in each other’s choices, and in shaping
markets, is of greater importance. The growth of Internet, the emergence of
user-generated content digital platforms, the use of social networks and the
increase of data availability, has not only emphasized this role, but also re-
duced the asymmetry between firms’ and consumers’ impact in determining
outcomes.
Among the eﬀects of considering social interdependence in consumption
is the introduction of a new source of variability: with the (endogenous)
dependence on each other, a consumer’s choice is no longer determinate a
priori whenever firms charge diﬀerent prices, as in the original framework.
When we introduce social influence and consider its strategic relevance, in-
diﬀerent consumers are no longer confined to the one point domain of firms
setting the same price (the unique indiﬀerence point in the original Bertrand
setting). Let us emphasize that, in this context, indiﬀerence does not mean
consumers do not care about the decision, but rather that they could ra-
tionally make diﬀerent decisions when facing the same conditions. Under
this interpretation it is natural to associate a probabilistic behavior to their
consumption decisions, which we call non-loyal behavior, as opposed to loyal
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or non-probabilistic consumption behavior.4 Observe, though, that non-loyal
behavior is not a new, or modern phenomenon. In fact, there has always been
intrinsic variability in human decision making. We do not always dress in
our favorite color and choose our favorite mode of transportation to eat our
favorite dish at our favorite restaurant. This does not appear to be an ‘irra-
tional’ behavior, but a rather natural human characteristic, independently of
whether it is conscious or not. The very meaning of the word favorite means
we favor some choice in detriment of another, and not that it is our only
(rational) choice. Social interdependence allows us to see non-loyal behavior,
not as a minimal and sporadic phenomenon, but rather as something rooted
in human (social) behavior.
The main idea behind the classic solutions to stabilize a pure price equi-
libria is turning the set of indiﬀerent consumers into a negligible set, so to
eliminate firms’ incentive to capture a mass of indiﬀerent consumers by un-
dercutting. This means the main obstruction to the existence of pure price
equilibria is eliminated by assuming indiﬀerent consumers are a zero measure
set, either because preferences are non-atomic or price quotations come from
a non-degenerate mixed price strategy. Once we allow non-loyal behavior
to be a locally persistent strategic phenomenon, it becomes clear that the
reasoning allowing firms to capture a positive mass of indiﬀerent consumers
with a small price deviation, leading to non-existence of pure price equilib-
ria, is anchored on two apparently innocuous, but quite strong assumptions
4We observe that loyalty diﬀers from installed base, since being loyal is, in this context,
a strategical behavior, thus endogenous, not imposed. Loyal consumers are just those who
opt for pure strategies.
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(which reflect the high asymmetry between firm and consumer power). First,
firms capture this mass because it is assumed they are able to turn non-loyal
consumers into loyal with a small price deviation. Second, when this mass is
captured, hence, when the mass moves, it is assumed to have no impact on
consumption choices.
Our approach is that non-loyal consumers are more sensitive and react to
small price deviations by varying the probability of consuming (instead of be-
coming loyal), while loyal consumers are less sensitive and react only to higher
price changes.5 As such the partition of consumers into loyal and non-loyal is
invariant for small price changes. The local stability of this partition creates
a local coordination device for firms by having associated a unique continuous
demand deviation, given by the non-loyal consumers’ probability change. In
sum, we propose that, with social interdependence, the set of indiﬀerent con-
sumers (non-loyal) is stable for small changes, and in general not a negligible
phenomenon. Roughly saying, this justifies the existence of asymmetric pure
price solutions, even in homogeneous frameworks, by using a positive mass
of indiﬀerent consumers to produce demand continuity, and loyal consumers
to create asymmetries. Social influence being negative smoothly removes the
incentive produced by a lower price. Hence, in an uniform price competition
market with social interaction, rather than an intrinsic price indeterminacy
problem due to determinate consumption behavior (for essentially all prices),
we have in the consumers behavior variability a road to stabilize prices.
5By lower sensitivity of loyal consumers, we mean that the equilibrium condition in-
equality for these consumers is strict, hence their best response is constant for a neighbor-
hood of the outcome. The idea that loyal consumers may have lower sensibility is rather
natural, and intuitive to the very notion of brand loyalty.
6
Modeling approach, results and related literature.
The study of a social component’s impact in consumption behavior has a long
tradition, in particular as an external eﬀect (or nonfunctional aspect) of con-
sumption/use of private or public goods/services. Notably, for example, in
the seminal works of Rae, Veblen, Leibstein or Tiebout (see for example [25],
[31] and references therein). Whether in a more intricate or simpler form,
and while not necessarily equal in every market or context, technological and
economic development, education, social awareness, financial autonomy and
access to information, have definitely brought changes to the social interde-
pendence level of our choices. In many cases, consumption itself is a social
act, driven by social interactions or concerns. The study of such phenomena
experiences particular growth and aroused interest, as the relevance and eco-
nomic implications of social influence are pointed out as a crucial direction
to follow (particularly the importance of network economics, see for example
[21], [17], [8]), and have been persistent as a field of interest (for example
[23], [20], [18], [5], and [11]). A survey including consumer demand under
network eﬀects and social influence can be found for example in [30].
In this work, we consider a duopoly with a finite set of consumers. The
modeling approach stands on three more or less standard principles: (i)
firms set prices to maximize profits; (ii) pricing and consumption have dif-
ferent time frames (prices only contribute to forming a behavioral intention,
which can thus be represented by a probability distribution over options);
(iii) consumers are influenced by each other behavior. In view of (ii) we con-
sider a two stage game, where the first stage is a duopoly pricing game, and
the second stage is a consumption game based on the observed prices. Each
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of the two subgames is a simultaneous move, complete information game.
Outcomes are evaluated according to the notion of Nash equilibrium and
subgame-perfection.
Following the theories of planned behavior and reasoned action, the con-
sumers utility is constructed on two commensurable components, personal
and social. The personal component reflects how a consumer values the char-
acteristics of each product, and we make no restriction on this component. In
particular the value could come from an atomic distribution of preferences,
and may include costs. The social component reflects how a consumer is
influenced by the decisions of others. Here, we follow the classic definitions
of influence and power from social psychology, in which power and influence
involve a dyadic relation between two consumers (e.g. French and Raven
[16]). Social power is defined as a structural property of a particular social
relationship, and reflects the consumer’s relative capacity to modify others’
payoﬀs, in some sense similar to Keltner et al [24] or Fiske and Berdahl [15].
We take social power as constant, and it is influence which varies according
to the particular strategy profile in question. Influence refers to the eﬀect on
individual i produced by another individual j, and social power is the max-
imum potential ability of i to influence j. Individuals exert influence only
through the action of choosing to consume from firm 1 or 2. When we talk
about positive and negative influence, we refer to whether consumers ‘like’ to
make the same decision or not (which may result from the passive presence
of j). With this, the utility becomes of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type,
and the behavioral intention a best response in the Nash sense.
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The approach to the consumers game finds its inspiration in the socio-
economic model of Brida et al. [9] that analyses how the choice of a service is
influenced by the profile of its users. The mathematical modeling foundations
for the consumers game and utility function are based on the two types
dichotomic model by Soeiro et al. [29] and its more general version in [28],
which, in turn, are grounded on the intersection of game theory and social
psychology, through the theories of planned behavior and reasoned action
(see for example [3]).
We show that, when social power is negative, a pure price subgame-perfect
equilibrium with positive profits for both firms exists. Furthermore, even in
the case products are not diﬀerentiated, asymmetric pure price equilibria al-
ways exist. There are some particular advantages in these solutions. A first
advantage is being free from any limitation (or assumption) on the distribu-
tion of preferences that leads to product diﬀerentiation. In particular, the
model could be seen as a discretization of the Hotelling line (the same for
vertical product diﬀerentiation), but where the distribution is possibly dis-
continuous, atomic, etc... Namely, this is applicable to situations where the
set of non-loyal (indiﬀerent) consumers is not irrelevant. A second advan-
tage is that one need not consider loyal consumers as exogeneously captive
installed bases of non-strategic individuals, or possibly locked by a switch
cost, but as strategic consumers using an integer probability behavior. We
then observe that, when social power is negative, having loyal consumers
reduces equilibrium prices. A fact which may at first seem counterintuitive,
nonetheless, a natural consequence of consumers preferring uncertain to cer-
tain negative influence. A third advantage is that heterogeneity (whether
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it is product diﬀerentiation, capacity constraints, or other), need not be im-
posed exogenously to achieve asymmetric pure price equilibria. Furthermore,
we show that the eﬀect of social product diﬀerentiation, which is endogenous
and possibly variable, as determined by social influence, overcomes the ef-
fect of standard product diﬀerentiation in creating price asymmetries. Note
however that we are by no means mitigating the importance of product dif-
ferentiation, or other type of heterogeneity introduced a priori. We are in
fact empowering the study of heterogeneity, by allowing its study to be in-
dependent of concerns or restrictions guaranteeing existence. With social
power, any form of heterogeneity may be studied on top of already existing
solutions. Moreover, and relating to the work in [7], this approach can be
used as yet another possible microeconomic foundation for linear demand.
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1 Model and main results
There are two firms and n consumers. The game begins with a pricing
stage, where firms act simultaneous and independently, followed by a con-
sumption stage, where consumers act simultaneous and independently. In
the first stage, each firm (j = 1, 2) sets a price pj for the service it provides.
For each pair of prices p ⌘ (p1, p2) 2 (R+0 )2, the second stage is a stan-
dard simultaneous move game, with the set of players (consumers) denoted
by I and two possible actions representing choosing one of the two firms.
Consumption is thus mandatory and the behavior strategy of a consumer i is
represented by a point ( i1(p),  i2(p)) in the standard probability simplex  1,
where  i1(p) ⌘  i(p) and  i2(p) ⌘ 1  i(p) represent, respectively, the prob-
ability of consumer i using the service provided by firm 1 and 2 at prices p.
A strategy profile for the game is thus a pair denoted (p⇤, (p)) formed by a
pair of prices p⇤ and a consumption behavior for every possible p summarized
by the profile  (p) ⌘ ( i1(p), . . . ,  in(p)) 2 ( 1)n. We will sometimes omitt
the dependence on p when there is no ambiguity and simplifies notation.
Nevertheless, we will make use of the distinction between a strategy profile
(p⇤, (p)) and the outcome (p⇤, (p⇤)). For example, payoﬀs for firms and
consumers depend only on outcomes, whereas behavior strategies are used
to evaluate the profitability of firm’s price deviations. We will study and
characterize subgame-perfect equilibria and the corresponding outcomes of
the two stage game.
Firms. For simplicity, we assume firms have no costs, neither in pro-
ducing nor in providing the service. In a given outcome (p, ), the demand
and profit for each firm j = 1, 2, are determined, respectively, by functions
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Dj : (R+0 )2 ⇥ ( 1)n ! [0, n], and ⇧j : (R+0 )2 ⇥ ( 1)n ! R+0 , given by6
Dj(p, ) ⌘
X
i2I
 ij(p), and ⇧j(p, ) = pjDj(p, ).
Consumers. For the construction of utility, one may think of the follow-
ing process: suppose there are two distributions characterizing, respectively,
personal and social preferences. These determine two components: (i) the
benefit bi1, bi2 2 R a consumer i derives from each product/service7; and (ii)
two matrices of dyadic interactions (one for each firm) whose entries are social
weights ↵ii01 ,↵ii
0
2 2 R, which represent how much a consumer i is influenced
by i0 when both choose to use the service from firm 1 or 2, respectively. The
aim of this work is to show that, even if the distributions of consumer types
are represented by density functions fb and f↵ which are concentrated at
a single point (leading to homogeneous consumers), outcomes with positive
profits for both firms exist, and may be asymmetrical.
We will thus consider an a priori homogeneous set of consumers. There-
fore, the personal benefit derived from the use of each service is independent
of the consumer, i.e. for every i 2 I we have bi1 = b1, bi2 = b2 2 R. The social
influence exerted at each service by the choice of other consumers is also
determined by only two social weights ↵1,↵2 2 R. These may be interpreted
as representing how much a consumer likes/dislikes to share the service from
6The probabilistic nature of demand can be interpreted either from a frequentist point
of view (i.e. consumption behavior over a period), or from the point of view that pricing
and consumption have a diﬀerent time frame, so prices in fact only determine a behavioral
intention.
7This benefit may be a result of aggregating diﬀerent characteristics, in particular it
may also involve costs. Hence, we impose no restriction to positive benefits.
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firm 1 or 2, respectively. These are the same for all consumers, nevertheless,
social influence, and thus payoﬀs in a given outcome, may diﬀer, as they
depend on the strategy profile. Personal and social parameters determine
the following pure strategy payoﬀs for a consumer i,
uj(p,  i) ⌘  pj + bj + ↵j
X
i0 6=i
 i
0
j (p), j = 1, 2.
The payoﬀs for consumers in a given outcome (p, ) are determined by the
expected utility function u : I ⇥ (R+0 )2 ⇥ ( 1)n ! R given by
ui(p, ) ⌘  i(p)u1(p,  i) + (1   i(p))u2(p,  i).
Social Power and product diﬀerentiation.
Let us set up notation for the price diﬀerence,
 p ⌘ p1   p2, (price diﬀerence),
and the diﬀerences of personal benefit and social weights, which characterize
product diﬀerentiation, and are denoted by
 b ⌘ b1   b2 (standard product diﬀerentiation);
 ↵ ⌘ ↵1   ↵2 (social product diﬀerentiation).
Let us also denote the diﬀerence in pure strategy payoﬀs for consumer i
by  u(p,  i) ⌘ u1(p,  i)   u2(p,  i). The payoﬀ of consumer i can
be rewritten as ui(p, ) =  i(p) u(p,  i) + u2(p,  i). The choice of a
behavior strategy by a given consumer i is determined by  u(p,  i). That
is, if  ui(p,  i) > 0 (resp. <0) consumer i’s best response is firm 1 (resp.
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firm 2), and consumer i is indiﬀerent when  ui(p,  i) = 0. This diﬀerence
in pure strategy payoﬀs is
 u(p,  i) =   p+ b+ ↵1
X
i0 6=i
 i
0   ↵2
X
i0 6=i
(1   i0)| {z }
social influence
.
In a given outcome (p, ), the social influence in the decision of consumer i
is a weighted diﬀerence of the consumption behavior of others. This reveals
the contextual nature of social product diﬀerentiation as opposed to the
intrinsic nature of standard diﬀerentiation. On the other hand, social power
is the potential influence a consumer has over another, i.e. the potential to
change the diﬀerence in pure strategy payoﬀs (to alter the aforementioned
relation). That is, social power of a consumer j over i, is the maximum eﬀect
j can produce on  ui(p, ).8 The social influence term can be rewritten as
(↵1+↵2)
P
i0 6=i  
i0 +↵2(n 1). If a consumer j 6= i, changes from  j to  j+",
leading the profile   to become  0, then the influence change on i is given
by  u(p, 0 i) =  u(p,  i) + "(↵1 + ↵2), for some " 2 [  j, 1    j]. How
much power is exerted by j with this change depends on the choice of ". As
such, in our approach, the social power of an individual (consumer) is
A ⌘ ↵1 + ↵2.
The maximum influence that can be exerted upon a consumer is A(n   1),
which happens only when all other consumers change from one pure strat-
egy to the other. As we are in an homogeneous case, with indistinguishable
consumers, not only is product diﬀerentiation the same, but all consumers
8The issue of intention is beyond the scope of this work.
14
have the same social power. Influence, depends on the behavior strategy
used by each consumer. The characterization of a consumers preference pro-
file depends on standard product diﬀerentiation  b, but on both ↵1 and
↵2, not only on their diﬀerence. Hence, the consumers preference profile is
determined by the pair ( b,↵), where ↵ ⌘ (↵1,↵2).
Main results.
The equilibrium behavior drastically diﬀers whether social power is posi-
tive or negative. Positive social power, A > 0, is associated with a type
of conformity, bandwagon, or herd behavior, leading to type symmetries.
Negative social power, A < 0, is usually associated to some type of con-
gestion/snob/Veblen eﬀect. The case A = 0 contains the original Bertrand
framework.
We will show that, given a consumers preference profile ( b,↵), equilibria
may be characterized in terms of social power A as follows:
(i) when A   0, in a subgame-perfect equilibrium at least one firm has
zero profit, i.e. an equilibrium is either a monopoly or the Bertrand
zero profit equilibrium;
(ii) when A < 0, if consumers are influenceable, then non-monopolistic
subgame-perfect equilibria exist, with positive profits for both firms.
The case where consumers have negative social power, case (ii), is the focus
of this work. Let us discuss what we mean by influenceable in the case of
negative social power. For a non-monopolistic equilibrium to exist we must
guarantee that consumers do care about each other decisions, i.e. | b| is
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not too high relative to social power. When products are standardly diﬀer-
entiated,  b 6= 0, existence of a positive prices equilibrium does not follow
without a limitation on the extent of asymmetry created by standard product
diﬀerentiation (the magnitude of | b|). Namely, on how much one product
or service is preferred over the other. We must thus impose consumers be in-
fluenceable, otherwise, they would just choose the firm with highest personal
benefit, regardless of the choice of other consumers.
Let us make this precise. Define an upper and lower bound for standard
product diﬀerentiation, respectively, B ⌘ (A + ↵2)(n   1) and B ⌘  (↵1 +
A)(n   1). This defines an interval of size  3A(n   1). Given a preference
profile ( b,↵) we say that consumers are negatively influenceable if A < 0
and  b 2 (B,B).9
Theorem 1. Every duopoly with homogeneous and negatively influenceable
consumers has a pure price subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive prof-
its for both firms. Furthermore, the unique symmetric credible consumers
strategy is a focal equilibrium for consumers.
The first part of the theorem establishes existence and has a straightfor-
ward important corollary: when b1 = b2 and ↵1 = ↵2, i.e. when there is no
product diﬀerentiation, as B < 0, B > 0, and  b = 0, negative social power
A < 0 is suﬃcient to guarantee consumers are negatively influenceable.
9Note that this is a wide interval, which in particular will allow monopolies to be cred-
ible from the consumers game point of view. Nevertheless, firms will prefer to compete as
that will produce higher profits. In terms of parameter interpretation from the consumers
point of view, disregarding prices, it could be naturally reduced to |A|(n   1). Here the
choice of influenceability is made taking into account the game outcome.
16
Corollary 1. Every undiﬀerentiated duopoly with homogeneous consumers
and negative social power has a pure price subgame-perfect equilibrium with
positive profits for both firms.
When both consumers and products (hence firms) are homogeneous, there
is no a priori asymmetry, and, as such, it is not necessary to impose influ-
enceability, because consumers are influenceable as long as A 6= 0 (there is
no intrinsic preference for one of the products).
Once existence has been established, the question is whether prices and
profit are the same. Note that equilibria with positive profits for both firms
are not unique. The second part of the theorem refers to a comparison be-
tween several possible equilibria, where by symmetric we mean a strategy
which is the same for all consumers. Let us develop this. Observe that a
consumption profile induces a partition of the consumers set according to
whether they use a pure or non-degenerate mixed strategy. We call the for-
mer loyal and the latter non-loyal consumers. Let us denote: the number
of non-loyal consumers by m(p, ) ⌘ #{i 2 I : 0 <  i(p) < 1}; the num-
ber of consumers loyal to firm 1 by l1(p, ) ⌘ #{i 2 I :  i(p) = 1}; and
define l2(p, ) analogously. From here on we will omit the outcome depen-
dence and use l1, m and l2. We call (l1,m, l2) a loyalty characterization of a
given outcome. Note that, as the total number of consumers, n, is fixed and
known, the knowledge of three coordinates is seemingly redundant. However,
we will use it as a triplet because for equilibrium characterization the rele-
vant information is the asymmetry of these three coordinates, rather than
the number of consumers (which would in fact introduce a third coordinate
anyway). Let us denote the diﬀerence in loyalty by  l ⌘ l1   l2. We will
17
show that in an equilibrium the price diﬀerence is determined by some loyalty
characterization and given by
 p⇤(l1,m, l2; b,↵) =
1
3
✓
2 b+ (n  1) ↵ + A l
m
◆
. (1)
We observe that, according to Equation (1), the main driver of price asym-
metries is social product diﬀerentiation. Furthermore, the eﬀect of standard
product diﬀerentiation is overcome even for small markets. Note also that,
as social power is negative, increasing the number of loyal consumers for firm
1 ( l > 0), decreases the equilibrium price diﬀerence towards firm 2.
The asymmetry in prices is dependent on three terms. This means that,
when products are diﬀerentiated, an equilibrium may involve diﬀerent prices
even if the consumers strategy or the loyalty characterization is symmetric
( l = 0). If there is no product diﬀerentiation equilibrium outcomes with
positive profits may exist with a price diﬀerence proportional to a relative
loyalty ratio ( l/m) acording to social power A. The question remaining
is whether asymmetric equilibria exist (i.e. whether asymmetric loyal con-
sumption,  l 6= 0, is credible) when  b =  ↵ = 0.
Theorem 2. If A < 0, every undiﬀerentiated duopoly has an asymmetric
pure price subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for both firms.
Furthermore, in such an equilibrium firms have diﬀerent prices and profits.
These results show that neither heterogeneity nor product diﬀerentiation
are necessary to resolve the classical Bertrand paradox, nor to achieve asym-
metric pure price equilibria. In particular, no assumption on the distribution
of consumer types is necessary.
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2 Equilibrium demand and prices
2.1 Consumption stage equilibria
A consumption behavior profile  (p) is credible for prices p⇤ if it is a sec-
ond stage Nash equilibrium given the price pair p⇤. We say that a loyalty
characterization (l⇤1,m⇤, l⇤2) is credible for a price diﬀerence  p⇤ if there is a
consumption profile which is credible for p⇤ and has loyalty characterization
lj(p⇤, (p⇤)) = l⇤j , for j = 1, 2 and m(p⇤, (p⇤)) = m⇤. The price (diﬀer-
ence) domain PD(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) of each loyalty characterization is the
set of price diferences  p for which (l1,m, l2) is credible when the consumers
profile is ( b,↵). This will be abbreviated to PD(l1,m, l2).
The characterization of credible demand reduces to that of consumption
stage Nash equilibria. The following threshold characterization is adapted
from [29], where the full characterization of Nash equilibria is done for a
one stage game with two types of players and two possible actions. The
results there apply here as a reduction to the one-dimensional case of the
second stage subgame (one type of players: homogeneous consumers). Here
we include prices in the parameter space of the consumers subgame, and we
will characterize the price diﬀerences for which a given behavior strategy is
a Nash equilibrium.
Let us define the following decision threshold function,
T (l1) ⌘ T (l1; ( b,↵)) ⌘  b+ ↵1(l1   1)  ↵2(n  l1). (2)
Note that the term ↵1(l1   1)   ↵2(n   l1) = A(l1   1)   ↵2(n   1) reflects
the aforementioned contextual nature of social product diﬀerentiation, which
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is then added to standard product diﬀerentiation to produce a price thresh-
old for a consumption decision. The interpretation is a limit for the price
diﬀerence, under which a set of strategies is still credible.
Strictly loyal consumption. Let A 6= 0, and let us start with the cases
where there are only loyal consumers (i.e. m = 0), which form the base tiles
of price domains. For non-monopolistic loyalty characterizations (l1, l2 6= n)
there are right and left thresholds for a price diﬀerence increase/ decrease
before a consumer is lost/ gain. Naturally, for monopolistic demand there is
only an upper limit in price before a consumer is lost.
(i) PD(n, 0, 0) = ( 1, T (n)];
(ii) PD(l1, 0, n  l1) = [T (l1 + 1), T (l1)], for l1 2 {1, . . . , n  1}.
(iii) PD(0, 0, n) = [T (1),+1);10
Observe that T (l1 + k) = T (l1) + kA. When A < 0, the price domains of
non-monopolistic characterizations are contained in the interval (T (n), T (1))
which is partitioned in n   1 intervals of size |A| by the set of thresholds
{T (n), . . . , T (1)}, and, as T (l1 + 1) < T (l1), all these price domains are
non-empty (or non-degenerate). When A > 0, as T (n) > T (1) (and in
fact T (l1 + 1) > T (l1) for all l1), the domains of non-monopolistic loyalty
characterizations with m = 0 are empty. However, there is an interval where
both monopolies coexist as credible outcomes, in this case [T (1), T (n)].
10Note that the threshold is constructed in terms of firm 1 for simplicity. After loosing
all consumers, there’s no limit to price, thus T (0) has no meaning. We observe also that
there is no problem with infinite prices, since firms are not allowed to collude, and will
have the incentive to deviate from a high price of the other firm.
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Non-loyal consumption. Loyalty characterizations with non-loyal con-
sumers connect two purely loyal equilibria. A loyalty characterization (l1,m, l2)
with m   1 connects (l1 +m, 0, l2) to (l1, 0, l2 +m), and the conection exists
in the case the latter two are credible.
With positive social power, A > 0, consumers are either all loyal or all
non-loyal, that is, all credible consumption outcomes are type-symmetric, a
conformity eﬀect (see [28, 29]). In the unique credible case, m = n, we have
PD(0, n, 0) = (T (1), T (n)).
When A < 0, the price domain of characterizations with m   1 is
PD(l1,m, l2) = (T (l1 +m), T (l1 + 1)). When m = 1 the domain reduces
to a point,  p = T (l1 + 1), and any value of  i 2 (0, 1) is credible for that
consumer.
Following [29], in a Nash equilibrium, if A 6= 0, then for all i, j 2 I with
0 <  i,  j < 1 we must have  i =  j (non-degenerate behavior strategies are
type-symmetric when A 6= 0). This does not mean that a priori there is a
unique credible demand for each pair of prices. Nevertheless, given a (fixed)
loyalty characterization, if m > 1, demand is either credible and uniquely de-
termined by the price diﬀerence, or non-credible for price diﬀerences outside
its domain. With this, each strategy class (l1,m, l2) with m > 1 has asso-
ciated to each price diﬀerence in its domain PD(l1,m, l2) a unique credible
non-integer probability11, given by
q( p; l1,m, l2) ⌘ q( p; l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) = T (l1 + 1)  p A(m  1) . (3)
Therefore, there is a unique credible demand (for firm 1) which preserves
11If two consumers use diﬀerent strategies, it leads to  ui 6=  uj and they could not
both be 0, hence one of them must use a pure strategy (see [29]).
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(a) A < 0. (b) A > 0.
Figure 1: A depiction of the fiber space of credible demand. On the left we
consider n = 6 for ease of visualization. We have used RGB colors in the
range [0, 1] in the following way (l1/n,m/n, l2/n).
the loyalty characterization in its credible price domain, given by the func-
tion l1 +mq( p; l1,m, l2). We observe that, in the respective price domain
0 < q( p; l1,m, l2) < 1. This is the credible behavior strategy of non-loyal
consumers; the probability of choosing firm 1.
Summing up, the characterization of consumption equilibria can be done
completely using the partition into strategy classes according to loyalty. The
set of second stage Nash equilibria is a fiber space representing the possi-
bilities of credible demand for each price diﬀerence  p. This fiber space is
formed by the union of horizontal (m = 0), vertical (m = 1) and oblique
(m > 1) line segments, each with a particular price domain (see Figure 1).
Each segment (fiber) is identified by (l1,m, l2). Given  p, a loyalty char-
acterization (l1,m, l2) determines a unique point in this fiber space, i.e. it
determines a unique value for credible demand at  p.
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2.2 Non-monopolistic outcomes
With the characterization of credible demand, we are now able to characterize
the candidates to subgame-perfect outcomes positive profits for both firms.
Lemma 1. Given a consumers preference profile ( b,↵), a strategy profile
(p⇤, ⇤(p)) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for both firms
only if there is a loyalty characterization (l1,m, l2) with m > 1 and a neigh-
bourhood V ( p⇤) ⇢ PD(l1,m, l2) where for all p such that p1  p⇤2 2 V ( p⇤)
and p⇤1   p2 2 V ( p⇤), we have
D1(p1, p
⇤
2, 
⇤(p)) = l1 +mq(p1   p⇤2; l1,m, l2);
D2(p
⇤
1, p2, 
⇤(p)) = l2 +m(1  q(p⇤1   p2; l1,m, l2)).
Observe that: (i) the result does not apply to equilibria where at least
one firm is with price equal to zero, i.e. these equilibria (both the Bertrand
zero profit and monopolies) may exist and are not included in this Lemma,
which is, however, suﬃcient for the purpose of this work; (ii) a consequence of
Lemma 1 is that when A > 0 equilibria with positive profits for both firms do
not exist. When A > 0 there is unique possibility, (0, n, 0), in which qj( p)
increases with price, thus it cannot be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium
with positive prices for both firms.
Remark 1. When A > 0, in a subgame-perfect equilibrium at least one firm
has zero profits.
Consider the case A < 0. Recall the interval (B,B) referred to in Section
1 (consumers are influenceable if  b 2 (B,B)), where B ⌘ (↵1+2↵2)(n  1)
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and B ⌘  (2↵1 + ↵2)(n   1). Given a loyalty characterization, let us now
define standard product diﬀerentiation thresholds,
BL(l1,m, l2;↵) ⌘ B + |A|
✓
3l1    l
m
◆
,
BR(l1,m, l2;↵) ⌘ B   |A|
✓
3l2 +
 l
m
◆
.
The standard diﬀerentiation domain (personal Benefit Domain), is
BD(l1,m, l2;↵) ⌘ (BL(l1,m, l2;↵), BR(l1,m, l2;↵)).
The size of the domain is 3|A|(m   1). Note that for all loyalty characteri-
zations, we have BD(l1,m, l2;↵) ✓ (B,B).
Lemma 2. Consider a consumers preference profile ( b,↵). A strategy
profile (p⇤, ⇤(p)) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for
both firms, only if, A < 0, there is a loyalty characterization (l1,m, l2) with
m > 1 such that  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2;↵), and outcome prices are
p⇤1 =
1
3
✓
 b  B   |A|
✓
2l1 + l2
m
◆◆
;
p⇤2 =
1
3
✓
B   b  |A|
✓
l1 + 2l2
m
◆◆
.
This Lemma determines, for each loyalty characterization (l1,m, l2), an
aﬃne correspondence between standard product diﬀerentiation  b and out-
come prices. Thus, for a given consumer preference profile ( b,↵) it de-
fines outcome price functions p⇤j(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) for j = 1, 2 and an out-
come price diﬀerence function  p⇤(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) (which was presented
in Equation 1 appearing on Section 1). Furthermore, substituting to obtain
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D⇤1 ⌘ D1(p⇤, ⇤(p⇤)) by using Lemma 1 together with Lemma 2, outcome
demand is implicitly determined, (recall that D⇤2 = n D⇤1),
D⇤1 = D
⇤
1(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) = l1 +m
 b  BL(l1,m, l2)
3|A|(m  1) . (4)
In turn, these determine profits for these outcomes
⇧⇤j(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) = p
⇤
j(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵))D
⇤
j (l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)).
Analyzing the three terms in the expression for p⇤1(l1,m, l2; ( b,↵)) given
by Lemma 2, we see that, the first term,  b, reflects the straightforward intu-
ition that equilibrium prices increase if the relative benefit consumers derive
from using that service increases. In fact, this is so, proportionally to the dis-
tance to the lower bound B. This second term, B, is not as straightforward,
seen that it already includes social power, A = ↵1+↵2: as A < 0, we get that
 B =  (A+ ↵2)(n  1) is always positive. Equilibrium price of firm 1 thus
increases proportionally to the number of consumers according to the magni-
tude of social power added/ discounted by how much consumers ‘like/ don’t
like to be together’ while using service provided by firm 2 (firm 1 charges
higher prices when consumers don’t like to be together while using service
from firm 2, ↵2 < 0). More interesting is the third term  |A| (2l1 + l2) /m.
Prices decrease the more a firm transforms consumers from non-loyal to loyal
(note that n is fixed). So equilibrium prices actually decrease with an in-
crease of the number of loyal consumers. On the other side, this term is
smaller when there are more non-loyal consumers, hence prices are higher.
We will abbreviate the expressions for outcome prices, demand and profits
by omitting the dependence on ( b,↵), which is exogeneously given.
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3 Existence
Given some consumers preferences ( b,↵) consider the set of strategy pro-
files (p⇤, ⇤(p)) which satisfy both Lemma 1 and 2, i.e. a set of admissible
strategies, denoted AS( b,↵). Given ( b,↵), an admissible strategy is a
strategy profile of the game, (p⇤, ⇤(p)), for which there is a loyalty char-
acterization (l1,m, l2) with m > 1 such that p⇤ = (p⇤1(l1,m, l2), p⇤2(l1,m, l2))
and such that demand based on consumption behavior  ⇤(p) restricted to
some neighborhood of  p⇤ is determined by q( p; l1,m, l2). A subgame-
perfect equilibrium with a positive profits outcome for both firms must be
an admissible strategy. We observe that, although associated to each loyalty
characterization (l1,m, l2) is a unique pair of outcome prices and demand,
this does not mean there is a unique strategy leading up to that outcome.
However, because the loyalty characterization uniquely determines prices and
demand in their neighborhood, the possible loyalty characterizations with
m > 1 induce an equivalence relation in AS( b,↵) with respect to outcome
demand and prices. We denote the strategy classes in this equivalence rela-
tion by (l1,m, l2). We are interested in studying and distinguishing equilibria
up to these classes. All strategies within the same class produce the same
outcome prices and demand. Note, however, this does not mean there cannot
be equilibria from diﬀerent classes with the same prices! What happens is
these have diﬀerent outcome demand (thus consumer behavior).
In each class (l1,m, l2) there is a subclass of strategies in which the con-
sumer behavior preserves the loyalty characterization in its whole price do-
main, PD(l1,m, l2) = (T (l1 + m), T (l1 + 1)). This strategy induces, in the
respective price domain, continuous and linear demand (a segment in the
26
Figure 2: The possible profit functions for firm 1 induced, respectively, by
loyalty preserving strategies in (2, 4, 0), (1, 4, 1), and (0, 4, 2) in the case  b =
0, ↵1 = ↵2 =  12 with n = 6 consumers. We use RGB colors as before.
fiber) determined by (l1,m, l2) and q( p; l1,m, l2). In particular, for these
strategies there are no incentives for firms to deviate within the price do-
main. Moreover, the price diﬀerence interval for which there are second stage
equilibria with non-monopolistic demand outcomes is [T (n), T (1)]. For price
diﬀerences outside this interval, demand is well defined: when  p < T (n) the
unique credible demand is D1 = n and for  p > T (1) it is D1 = 0. As such,
the main issue for existence of an equilibrium in the class (l1,m, l2) is how
consumers behave in the intervals (T (n), T (l1+m)) and (T (l1+1), T (1)), i.e.
what is their behavior when the loyalty characterization is no longer credible
but multiple second stage equilibria exist? How is profit outside this domain?
The idea behind existence of an equilibrium with characterization (l1,m, l2)
is whether the equilibrium price diﬀerence  p⇤(l1,m, l2) is suﬃciently away
from its price domain’s boundaries (T (l1 +m), T (l1 + 1)). As this is the do-
main of credibility for (l1,m, l2), when  p⇤ is too close to one of the thresh-
olds, one of the firms may have an incentive to force a change of loyalty
characterization with a small price deviation, which is either a jump or non-
diﬀerentiable point in demand. In terms of firm 1, this means the price p⇤1
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(a) (2, 3, 1) satisfies condition (i). (b) (3, 3, 1) does not satisfy condition (i).
Figure 3: Ilustration of Lemma 3,  b = 0, ↵1 = ↵2 =  12 . Marked in orange
are the respective points P1(k; (l1,m, l2)).
found in Lemma 2 is only guaranteed as a profit maximum in the interval
between p⇤2+T (l1+m) and p⇤2+T (l1+1) and three situations may occur: the
outcome may be an equilibrium independently of the continuation chosen, it
may depend on that choice, or it may not be an equilibrium independently of
that choice. An example of the three possible situations is depicted in Figure
2, referring to the undiﬀerentiated case.
Consider a consumers preference profile ( b,↵). Given a loyalty charac-
terization (l1,m, l2), let us define for some k 2 {0, n  3} the following
P1(k; (l1,m, l2)) ⌘ p⇤2(l1,m, l2) + T (k + 2) +
 A
n  k ;
P2(k; (l1,m, l2)) ⌘ p⇤1(l1,m, l2)  T (n  k   1) +
 A
n  k .
28
Lemma 3. Consider a consumers preference profile ( b,↵). A subgame-
perfect equilibrium belonging to a (l1,m, l2) class with m > 1 exists if, and
only if, A < 0,  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2;↵), and
(i) when l1 > 0, for every k 2 {0, . . . , l1   1},
⇧⇤1(l1,m, l2)   (k + 1)P1(k; (l1,m, l2));
(ii) when l2 > 0, for every k 2 {0, . . . , l2   1},
⇧⇤2(l1,m, l2)   (k + 1)P2(k; (l1,m, l2)).
Interestingly, the only actual deviation incentives for firms are an increase
in price, maintaining or even reducing the number of loyal consumers (hence
the variable k), and possibly capturing more non-loyal consumers. Increasing
the number of loyal consumers decreases equilibrium prices. In the right
hand side of the inequalities in this Lemma are possible profits for credible
consumer strategies with demand adding up to k + 1, credible at p1 = P1.
Figure 3 contains an ilustration of this Lemma.
Proof outline. We start by showing that credible demand is bounded below
by a piecewise linear (credible demand) function. The proof then follows by
establishing conditions under which the isoprofit function is above.
Recall that, given a consumers preference profile with A < 0, for all
(l1,m, l2), BD(l1,m, l2;↵) ✓ (B,B) and that BD(0, n, 0;↵) = (B,B).
Theorem 1. Consider a consumers preference profile ( b,↵) with A < 0.
If  b 2 (B,B), a subgame-perfect equilibrium belonging to the strategy class
(0, n, 0) exists.
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Proof. Observe that if  b 2 (B,B), the class (0, n, 0) trivially satisfies
Lemma 3.
We have taken the liberty to rewrite Theorem 1 (which was presented
in Section 1) with the terminology and concepts introduced in these latter
sections, but the underlying result is exactly the same: it establishes existence
by construction of an equilibrium. Outcome demand corresponds to the case
where all consumers are non-loyal.
A corollary of Theorem 1, also presented in Section 1, is that in the case
products are not diﬀerentiated, existence is guaranteed when A < 0.
Corollary 1. Every undiﬀerentiated duopoly with homogeneous consumers
and negative social power has a pure price subgame-perfect equilibrium with
positive profits for both firms.
The question of whether asymmetric pure price equilibria exist is partic-
ularly troublesome in this case. We recall that the outcome price diﬀerence
comprises three components which drive the price asymmetry eﬀect,
3 p⇤(l1,m, l2) = 2 b+ (n  1) ↵| {z }
product
diﬀerentiation
eﬀect
+ A
 l
m|{z}
loyalty
behavior
eﬀect
.
In the case with no product diﬀerentiation, the diﬀerence in price relies on l.
As such, the existence based on Theorem 1 does not produce diﬀerent prices.
Therefore, we want to prove that at least an equilibrium with asymmetric
loyal consumption exists. This is done in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. If A < 0, every undiﬀerentiated duopoly has an asymmetric
pure price subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for both firms.
Furthermore, in such an equilibrium firms have diﬀerent prices and profits.
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4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that when consumers have negative social power, a pure price
subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for both firms exists, and
even in the case products are not diﬀerentiated, asymmetric pure price equi-
libria always exist. There are some natural extensions to the model, namely:
(i) considering consumer heterogeneity by allowing for more than one atom in
the distribution of types; (ii) extending the duopoly to an oligopoly; and/ or
(iii) removing mandatory consumption and introducing a reservation price.
In fact, following the work in [7], one can use social power as another alter-
native microeconomic foundation to deduce the general form linear demand,
D1(p1, p2) =     p1 +  p2,
where  ,  ,   are given, in this case, for each class (l1,m, l2), by
  = l1 +
m
 A(m  1)T (l1 + 1) > 0 and   =   =
m
 A(m  1) > 0.
Note that own eﬀects do not dominate cross eﬀects due to mandatory con-
sumption forcing D1 = n  D2. That can also be relaxed by introducing in
the action space of consumers a third option, without creating any particular
obstacle. Nevertheless, these extensions, although being with no doubt in-
teresting for further study, do not contribute or add to the point in question
here. The main idea of smoothing demand by allowing consumers to use
behavior strategies in an interval, which is created by network eﬀects, is in
itself, a general idea. If one intends to study price competition with restored
demand continuity, possibly even coupled with other strategic variables, this
approach to stabilize pure price solutions lends itself to fairly straightforward
incorporation into any scenario, or model.
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(a) Three particular characteriza-
tions (l1,m, l2).
(b) All possible loyalty characteriza-
tions.
Figure 4: Equilibrium outcome profits of firm 1 in a case with 60 consumers.
We have set ↵1 = ↵2 =  1, and on the left are depicted equilibrium profits in
terms of  b for the classes (40, 10, 10), (10, 40, 10), (10, 10, 40). On the right,
all possible classes (loyalty characterizations) with m > 1. We use RGB
colors as before. We observe that the greener lines (equilibria with higher
number of non-loyal consumers), have a larger domain and produce higher
profits. Naturally, equilibria with higher number of loyal consumers for one
firm exist in domains where that firm is preferred.
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A Proofs
Let us define for ease of notation the function
Q1( p; l1,m, l2) ⌘ l1 +mq( p; l1,m, l2).
Lemma 1
Proof. Let (p⇤, ⇤(p)) be a subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive prof-
its for both firms, hence, where p⇤1, p⇤2 6= 0. We will do the proof in terms of
firm 1, firm 2 is analogous. Note that whether demand is credible or not for
prices p depends only on  p, and not on the particular prices being charged.
Thus we can write D1( p, ⇤). Let us denote equilibrium outcome demand
by D⇤1 ⌘ D1( p⇤, ⇤). Because D⇤1 is a result of profit maximization for both
firms, it must lie at the intersection of isoprofit functions, and be tangent to
both. In particular, as both firms can change their price in both directions,
D⇤1 must have the same right and left limit (jumps provide incentive to price
deviations), and the same slope to the right and to the left (else demand
crosses at least one of the isoprofits). Recall that credible demand is con-
tained in a fiber space formed by the union of horizontal (m = 0), vertical
(m = 1) and oblique (m > 1) line segments. Having the same right and
left limit means that either D⇤1 is located at a point whose neighborhood has
constant loyalty characterization (demand stays in the same segment), or at
an intersection point (if it changes segment). If demand stays in the same
segment for an interval containing  p⇤, then m > 1 (because for m = 1 the
domain is a single point and if m = 0 a change in price would produce no
change in demand (horizontal line) and there would be an incentive), which
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means demand is on an oblique segment, thus given by Q1( p; l1,m, l2). So
we are left with the case where D⇤1 lies at an intersection point, possibly lead-
ing to a change of loyalty characterization. If A > 0 there is a unique oblique
line m = n. If A < 0, as the slope of each line is (completely) determined
by m (for obliques it is mA(m 1)) and oblique lines with the same m start at
T (l1 +m), thus depending on l1, diﬀerent loyalty characterizations (line seg-
ments) which intersect, have diﬀerent slopes (note that l1 +m = n  l2 and
n is fixed). Furthermore, the number of possible loyalty characterizations is
finite, hence, all the intersection points of these segments are isolated, that
is, there is as neighborhood (of  p), for which they are unique. As such
there is a neighborhood of  p⇤ for which, at most, there is a unique change
of demand’s loyalty characterization, in this case happening at  p⇤. In both
cases A > 0 and A < 0, seen that at D⇤1 the right and left slope must be
the same, this means that the loyalty characterization on the left and right
of  p⇤ must be the same. Therefore, there must be an interval containing
 p⇤ for which the loyalty characterization is constant, except possibly at
 p⇤. But if  p⇤ is an intersection point, demand is nevertheless given by
Q1( p; l1,m, l2). In particular, this means the equilibrium must lie at an in-
terior point of the price domain, as at the boundary there must be a change
to a diﬀerent loyalty characterization (the previous is no longer credible).
Lemma 2
Proof. Let (p⇤, ⇤(p)) be a subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits
for both firms. For each loyalty characterization consider the function F1 ⌘
F1(l1,m, l2) : (p⇤2 + T (l1 + m), p
⇤
2 + T (l1 + 1)) ! R, given by F1(p1) =
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p1Q1(p1, p⇤2; l1,m, l2). According to Lemma 1 there is (l1,m, l2) with m > 1
and a neighbourhood V ( p⇤) 2 (T (l1+m), T (l1+1)) such that, for p1 p⇤2 2
V ( p⇤) we have ⇧1(p1, p⇤2, ⇤(p1, p⇤2)) = F1(p1). Using the expression for Q1
(see equation 3) we get
F1(p1) =
m
A(m  1)p
2
1 +
✓
l1 +m
✓
p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1)
 A(m  1)
◆◆
p1.
Note that as (l1,m, l2) is credible we have  p⇤ 2 (T (l1+m), T (l1+1)), hence
p⇤1 < p
⇤
2 + T (l1 + 1), and as p⇤1 > 0 by assumption, so is p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1).
A first question is whether the underlying quadratic function maximum is
interior to the domain of F1 or if it is outside, thus making the maximum
of F1 be at the boundary of its domain. Suppose the maximum of F1 is pM
at the boundary. Then pM   p⇤2 =  p would not be an interior point of
(T (l1 +m), T (l1 + 1)), and according to Lemma 1, (p⇤, ⇤(p)) cannot be a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. So the maximum of F1 must be interior. As
such it is given (using the first order condition) by
P1(p
⇤
2) =
p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1)
2
+
 A(m  1)l1
2m
.
Analougously we get
P2(p1) =
p1   T (l1 +m)
2
+
 A(m  1)l2
2m
.
Noting that T (l1+m) =  b+A(l1+m 1) ↵2(n 1) and that T (l1+1) =
 b+ Al1   ↵2(n  1) (see equation 2) we get that
P1(P2(p1)) =
p1
4
+
2T (l1 + 1)  T (l1 +m)
4
+
 A(m  1)
4m
(l2 + 2l1),
P1(P2(p1)) =
p1
4
+
 b  ↵2(n  1) + Al1   A(m  1)
4
+
 A(m  1)
4m
(l2+2l1).
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The fixed point, p⇤1 = P1(P2(p⇤1)) is
p⇤1 =
 b  ↵2(n  1) + Al1   A(m  1)
3
+
 A(m  1)
3m
(l2 + 2l1),
noting that l1 + l2 = n m, we get
p⇤1 =
 b  ↵2(n  1)  A(m  1)  A(n m)
3
+
A(l2 + 2l1)
3m
,
p⇤1 =
 b  (A+ ↵2)(n  1)
3
+
A(l2 + 2l1)
3m
,
thus leading to
p⇤1 =
1
3
✓
 b  B   |A|
✓
2l1 + l2
m
◆◆
.
From P2(p⇤1) we get p⇤2. Now, from both expressions we get
 p⇤ =
1
3
✓
2 b+ (n  1) ↵ + A l
m
◆
.
As we have seen, for the consumers behavior to be credible, we must have
 p⇤ 2 (T (l1+m), T (l1+1)) leading to an upper and lower bound for  b and
the remaining to be proved necessary condition  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2;↵). The
upper bound is determined by  p⇤ > T (l1 +m), leading to
1
3
✓
2 b+ (n  1) ↵ + A l
m
◆
>  b+ A(l1 +m  1)  ↵2(n  1),
 b < (n  1)↵1 + A l
m
  3A(l1 +m  1) + 2↵2(n  1).
Recalling that B = (↵1 + 2↵2)(n  1) and m = n  l1   l2 we get
 b < B   3A(n  1) + 3Al2 + A l
m
,
thus
 b < B + A
✓
3l2 +
 l
m
◆
.
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Similarly, the lower bound is
1
3
✓
2 b+ (n  1) ↵ + A l
m
◆
<  b+ Al1   ↵2(n  1),
thus
 b > B   A
✓
3l1    l
m
◆
.
To conclude the proof we will show that this guarantees positive prices. Note
that this can be rewritten as
 b  B >  A
✓
(3m  1)l1 + l2
m
◆
.
which for m > 1 implies that
 b  B >  A
✓
2l1 + l2
m
◆
,
hence p⇤1 > 0. Analougously, we can use the upper bound for the price of
firm 2. So,  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2;↵) in particular guarantees that p⇤1 > 0 and
p⇤2 > 0.
Lemma 3
Proof. Let A < 0,  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2) and consider an outcome with loyalty
characterization (l⇤1,m⇤, l⇤2) and prices p⇤ = (p⇤1(l1,m, l2), p⇤2(l1,m, l2)). Our
aim is to find suﬃcient and necessary conditions for existence of a strategy
profile (p⇤, ⇤(p)) which is a subgame-perfect equilibrium and produces the
above mentioned outcome.
We will do the analysis in terms of firm 1, firm 2 is analogous. It is helpful
to keep in mind Figure 3 throughout the proof. Recall that credible non-
monopolistic demand exists only for p1 2 [p⇤2 + T (n), p⇤2 + T (1)], an interval
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which is partioned in n   1 blocks of size A by the thresholds for each l1 2
{1, 2, . . . , n}. At each threshold point, say p1 = p⇤2+T (l1), the minimum and
maximum value for credible demand are, respectively, l1  1 and l1. As such
credible demand is bounded above by the line d1(p1) ⌘ n+ p1 (p
⇤
2+T (n))
A . Let
us denote Q⇤1(p1) ⌘ Q1(p1 p⇤2; l⇤1,m⇤, l⇤2). Recall that D⇤1 = Q1(p⇤1), and that
a credible strategy exists for which D1(p1, p⇤2) = Q⇤1(p1) in the whole domain
(p⇤2 + T (l
⇤
1 + m
⇤), p⇤2 + T (l
⇤
1 + 1)), which in particular preserves (l⇤1,m⇤, l⇤2).
The isoprofit demand curve for firm 1, h1(p1; (p⇤, ⇤(p⇤))) =
p⇤1D⇤1
p1
, which
we abbreviate to h1(p1), is tangent to Q⇤1(p1) at p⇤1. (Note that Q⇤1, h1 and
d1 have negative slopes.) As Q⇤1 is linear, the question is thus, are there
strategies for price deviations outside (p⇤2 + T (l⇤1 +m⇤), p⇤2 + T (l⇤1 +1)) which
lead to demand continuations of Q⇤1 below h1?
Let us start with the case p1  p⇤2+T (l⇤1+m⇤). As Q⇤1(p⇤2+T (l⇤1+m⇤)) =
d1(p⇤2+T (l
⇤
1+m
⇤)), h1 crosses d1 at a point p1 > p⇤2+T (l⇤1+m⇤), thus, because
d1   D1, any credible demand continuation of Q⇤1 for p1  p⇤2+T (l⇤1 +m⇤) is
below the isoprofit h1. There are no incentives for firm 1 to undercut.
Let us now look at the case p1   p⇤2 + T (l⇤1 + 1). When p1 > p⇤2 + T (1),
the unique credible demand is D1 = 0, therefore, we need only look at the
interval [p⇤2 + T (l⇤1 + 1), p⇤2 + T (1)), which is partitioned into l⇤1 blocks by
thresholds T (l⇤1 + 1), T (l⇤1), T (l⇤1   1), . . . , T (1). Note that, by Lemma 2, we
must have m⇤ > 1 and thus, at least two loyal consumers, i.e. 0  l⇤1 < n 2.
Claim 1. In every interval (block) [p⇤2 + T (l1 + 2), p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1)], where
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l1 2 {0, . . . , n  2}, demand for firm 1 is bounded below by
d1(p1) ⌘
8>>><>>>:
l1 + 1 if p⇤2 + T (l1 + 2)  p1  P I1 (l1)
Q1(p1   p⇤2; l1, n  l1, 0) if P I1 (l1)  p1  p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1)
.
where
P I1 (l1) = p
⇤
2 + T (l1 + 2) +
 A
n  l1 .
Taking into account the above claim, we need only guarantee that h1(p1)  
d1(p1) for p1 2 [p⇤2 + T (l⇤1 + 1), p⇤2 + T (1)). As Q1 decreases with price, this
amounts to show that h1(P I1 (l1))   d1(P I1 (l1)) in the aforementioned blocks
(intervals), i.e. for every l1 2 {0, . . . , l⇤1   1}. If this is the case, then at least
the strategy producing d1 is a credible continuation for demand in which
there are no incentives for firm 1 to deviate. We have thus to show that for
every l1 2 {0, . . . , l⇤1   1}, it holds that ⇧
⇤
1
P I1 (l1)
  l1 + 1. As P I1 (l1) > p⇤1 > 0,
we can rewrite this as ⇧⇤1   P I1 (l1)(l1 + 1).
Proof of Claim. Recall that the credible demand fiber space is formed by the
union of oblique line segments determined by Q1 for characterizations with
m > 1, and horizontal and vertical segments for m = 0 and m = 1. (Observe
figure 1.) For m > 1, each Q1 segment is completely determined by l1 and m
(note that l2 = n  l1 m), with price domain [p⇤2+T (l1+m), p⇤2+T (l1+1)].
Consider now a block (p⇤2+T (l1+2), p⇤2+T (l1+1)) for some l1 2 {0, . . . , n 2}.
The minimum value of credible demand at p1 = p⇤2 + T (l1 + 2) is l1 + 1 and
the maximum value at p1 = p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1) is l1 + 1, as such, all oblique lines
of the equilibrium fiber space, whose domain contains this block, cross the
horizontal line l1 + 1 (the unique credible non-oblique line in the mentioned
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interval). The first intersection happens at some point, call it pI1, such that
Q1(pI1 p⇤2; l01,m0, l02) = l1+1 for some characterization (l01,m0, l02). We will now
show that this characterization is of a particular form determined by l1. Given
a fixed l1, for every possible value of m0, i.e. 1 < m0  n   l1, the segments
determined by (l1,m0, n  l1 m0) intersect (end) at p⇤2+T (l1+1). The slope
of lines determined by Q1 is m
0
A(m0 1) , hence, among characterizations with l1,
the first to cross is of the form (l1, n   l1, 0) (maximum m0 for lowest slope
because A < 0). As such, characterizations with l02 = 0 are the candidates
to originate the first crossing at pI1. For all l01, characterizations of the form
(l01, n   l01, 0) intersect (start) at p⇤2 + T (n). As such the first crossing is
provided by the line which ends first, that is, where p⇤2+T (l01+1) is smallest
(the steepest line is where l01 is higher because m0 = n   l01). Taking into
account that it must contain the domain, (thus end after p⇤2 + T (l1 + 2))
we must have l01 < l1 + 1, and so we get l01 = l1. The first crossing in
the interval (p⇤2 + T (l1 + 2), p⇤2 + T (l1 + 1)) is thus determined by solving
Q1(pI1  p⇤2; l1, n  l1, 0) = l1+1, which is pI1 = P I1 (l1). From p⇤2+T (l1+1) to
P I1 (l1) minimum demand is l1+1, then it follows Q1(p1 p⇤2; l1, n  l1, 0).
Theorem 2
Proof. Consider a consumers profile for an undiﬀerentiated duopoly with
A < 0. We have b1 = b2, thus  b = 0, and ↵1 = ↵2 =  a/2 for some
a > 0, thus A =  a and  ↵ = 0. The proof follows by showing that there
are classes (l1,m, l2) with  l 6= 0 which satisfy Lemma 3. Note that, in
this case, B =  3a(n   1)/2 and B = 3a(n   1)/2. We get p⇤1 = a(n  
1)/2   a
✓
2l1 + l2
3m
◆
and p⇤2 = a(n   1)/2   a
✓
l1 + l22
3m
◆
. Furthermore,
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BL(l1,m, l2) =  3a(n  1)/2 + 3al1   a l
m
, and, replacing in the expression
for equilibrium demand in Equation 4, we get,
⇧⇤1(l1,m, l2) =
am
m  1
✓
(n  1)/2 
✓
2l1 + l2
3m
◆◆2
. (5)
Now, we also get that
P1(k; (l1,m, l2)) = a
✓
n  1 
✓
l1 + 2l2
3m
+ k + 1  1
n  k
◆◆
.
In order to satisfy condition (i) in Lemma 3, we must have for all k 2
{0, . . . , l1   1},
am
m  1
✓
(n  1)/2 
✓
2l1 + l2
3m
◆◆2
 
a(k + 1)
✓
n  1 
✓
l1 + 2l2
3m
+ k + 1  1
n  k
◆◆
.
Note that, as a > 0, this does not depend on a, and, moreover, the left
hand side can be rewritten as a quadratic in k + 1,
 (k + 1)2 + (k + 1)
✓
n  1  l1 + 2l2
3m
+
1
n  k
◆
,
with maximum at
1
2
✓
n  1  l1 + 2l2
3m
+
1
n  k
◆
, which is attained ‘inside’
the domain. For simplicity, let us consider a classes with l2 = 0 and m   2l1,
with l1 > 0, so that  l = l1. Such classes trivially satisfy condition (ii)
of Lemma 3. Furthermore, as k + 1 is an integer, 1/(n   k) < 1/m, and
1/m < (l1 + 2l2)/3m, we may remove the contribution of 1/(n  k) from the
above expression (if the maximum is not at an integer, it does not matter).
As such, for an equilibrium in these classes to exist, it is suﬃcient to show
that  b 2 BD(l1,m, l2) and
m
m  1
✓
n  1
2
  2l1 + l2
3m
◆2
 
✓
n  1
2
  l1 + 2l2
6m
◆2
.
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Substituting l2 = 0 and developing the squared expressions, we can get to
l21
✓
15m+ 1
6m(n  1)
◆
+
m
2
3(n  1)   l1(3m+ 1).
As m   2l1, we have that m2 3(n  1)   l13(n  1) > l1(3m+1). To conclude
the proof of existence for an equilibrium in these classes, note that, because
l1 < m/2 < (n   1)/2, we get BL(l1,m, l2) < 0 < BR(l1,m, l2), and as such
 b = 0 2 BD(l1,m, l2).
From the expressions in equations 1 and 5 it is clear that for each firm
prices and profits in these classes are diﬀerent.
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